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Abstract. Neural networks have demonstrated unmatched perfor-
mance in a range of classification tasks. Despite numerous efforts of
the research community, novelty detection remains one of the signifi-
cant limitations of neural networks. The ability to identify previously
unseen inputs as novel is crucial for our understanding of the deci-
sions made by neural networks. At runtime, inputs not falling into
any of the categories learned during training cannot be classified cor-
rectly by the neural network. Existing approaches treat the neural
network as a black box and try to detect novel inputs based on the
confidence of the output predictions. However, neural networks are
not trained to reduce their confidence for novel inputs, which lim-
its the effectiveness of these approaches. We propose a framework to
monitor a neural network by observing the hidden layers. We employ
a common abstraction from program analysis—boxes—to identify
novel behaviors in the monitored layers, i.e., inputs that cause behav-
iors outside the box. For each neuron, the boxes range over the values
seen in training. The framework is efficient and flexible to achieve a
desired trade-off between raising false warnings and detecting novel
inputs. We illustrate the performance and the robustness to variability
in the unknown classes on popular image-classification benchmarks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Neural networks have become the state of the art for a wide range of
academic and industrial machine-learning applications, such as im-
age or speech recognition [37, 36, 40]. With this technology becom-
ing ever more widespread, one of the next great challenges is building
techniques for identifying and mitigating intrinsic limitations of neu-
ral networks in the general problem domain of classification. Given
an input, a neural-network classifier must, by definition, output one
of the classes it was trained for. The ability to output “do not know”
for novel inputs (i.e., inputs corresponding to classes the network was
not trained for) is crucial for safety-critical applications. The soft-
ware architects of autonomous cars, for instance, are facing a trade-
off between efficiency and risk to misclassify anomalies [5, 39, 27].
This fundamental problem of novelty detection has been of great in-
terest to the research community (see the survey [30]). Moreover,
evaluating learning algorithms in the face of parameter or input vari-
ation has become a part of the emerging topic of explainable artificial
intelligence [12, 25], where interpretability is investigated as a way
to ascertain reliability of a learned system.
In search of a deeper understanding of the neural network’s deci-
sion making and improved runtime management of the novel inputs,
we turn to abstraction techniques commonly used in program anal-
ysis for monitoring complex safety-critical systems [10, 23, 7, 1].
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Figure 1: A schematic view of our monitoring framework.
Focusing on novelty detection, we propose to accompany the neural-
network classifier with a runtime monitor that supervises the deci-
sions. Fig. 1 depicts the high-level architecture of our framework.
Running in parallel, the neural network and the monitor share the
same interface, which allows for seamless integration into existing
tools. The framework receives an input to be classified and can have
two types of outputs: a classification (the neural network’s decision)
or a warning (“do not know”).
While this architecture is general enough to be applied to other
classification techniques, our work is built around neural networks.
The monitor “watches” a number of fixed network layers chosen to
incorporate the essential feature information, namely layers close to
the final network output [42]. The underlying assumption is that the
neurons at the watched layers exhibit a pattern typical for inputs of
the same class. The monitor is trained to recognize these patterns.
At runtime, the output of the watched layers is compared against
the corresponding pattern. In case of close resemblance, the monitor
accepts the input and the framework outputs the class predicted by
the neural network. In the opposite scenario, the monitor suspects the
network of making a classification decision in an atypical way. With
this suspicion, the monitor rejects the proposed class and outputs a
warning about a possible novelty instead.
The patterns (abstractions) we consider are intervals, or boxes,
overapproximating the set of known neuron valuations. Despite their
simplicity, our experiments show a remarkable novelty-detection per-
formance. Owing to their efficiency, boxes can be used for runtime
monitoring with no significant overhead.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. We propose an
abstraction-based approach to detect novel inputs to neural-network
classifiers, independent of their architecture. The abstraction at cho-
sen layers concisely represents all values ever seen during training.
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We can efficiently identify novel inputs at runtime by comparing the
behavior of the neural network to the abstraction. Our approach can
be tailored to a desired trade-off between the number of false warn-
ings and undetected novelties.
1.1 Related work
Runtime monitoring. Runtime monitoring for machine-learned
systems is a common approach in the literature. Bishop proposes to
use a runtime monitor to estimate the uncertainty in a neural net-
work, where statistical likelihood is used as the measure of nov-
elty [4]. However, unlike boxes, computing the likelihood is expen-
sive. The work by Gilpin considers a hierarchy of monitors: each
component of a system has its own monitor, and for each subsys-
tem consisting of several components there is a committee of mon-
itors [14]. Dokhanchi et al. present quality temporal logic for spec-
ifying properties of runtime monitors about label stability in video
streams [11]. Similar properties can be modeled with the model as-
sertions from [17]. The abstraction in our approach could be used
to explain when a label change is to be expected (namely, when,
over time, the vectors observed at layer ` approach the border of the
abstraction). Cheng et al. introduce Boolean abstraction for neural-
network monitoring, which, unlike the abstraction presented in this
paper, is specific to ReLU activation functions [6]. Since membership
reduces to (NP-complete) satisfiability, the approach is only scalable
for layers with a few neurons. In particular, unlike our box abstrac-
tion, the runtime efficiency is data-dependent and thus not suited for
monitoring systems with real-time response constraints.
Novelty detection. Novelty detection has been investigated by
many researchers (see, e.g., [30] for a survey). It is well known that
the problem stems from differences in data distributions at train-
ing and prediction time [2, 16]. Some approaches, e.g., the work by
Ganin and Lempitsky [13], attempt to circumvent such cases by do-
main adaptation [29], which requires sampling the distribution at run-
time. Other approaches try to detect novelties probabilistically, e.g.,
using nonparametric density estimation [18]. Few approaches, e.g.,
[31], perform an online adaptation of classifiers without having ac-
cess to the whole distribution. Our framework is orthogonal to these
stochastic techniques, since we construct an abstraction. Approaches
such as k-centers [41] and support-vector data description [26] con-
sider ideas related to the ball abstraction presented in our experi-
mental comparison (Section 6.4), but they do not operate on neural
networks. Another solution to detect novelties is one-class classifica-
tion, where a classifier is trained to separate inputs of a single class
from all other inputs (see, e.g., [32] for a recent approach).
A lightweight approach for detecting misclassification is to define
and evaluate confidence scores for neural networks (see, e.g., [16,
15]). A predefined threshold on the highest output value serves as a
reason to declare inputs as novel. In our experimental evaluation, we
compare the performance of this approach and our framework. Liang
et al. observe that novelties may result in lower confidence scores
when applying supportive perturbation to the input and temperature
scaling to the output [21]. In contrast, our monitor does not require
preprocessing of the input.
Sun and Lampert consider a generalization of novelty called out-
of-specs situation, which also includes the case that situations from
training never occur at runtime [35]. Although our approach targets
the task of novelty detection only, according to the criteria proposed
in that work, our framework is universal (applicable to different net-
work architectures), pre-trained ready (requires no access to network
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Figure 2: Left: a simple neural network with zero biases and a ReLU
activation function in the second (hidden) layer `2. Right: box ab-
straction for layer `2 and the inputs given in Ex. 1.
training), and nonparametric (uses no a priori knowledge about the
data distribution), but not black-box ready (since we require access
to the network output in chosen layers).
Complementary to novelty detection, failure prediction is the task
of finding incorrect classifications that do not arise from input nov-
elty (see e.g., [43]). Some approaches, e.g., open-set learning [3] and
zero-shot learning [28] learn new classes at training respectively at
prediction time, which also requires that novel inputs can be detected.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We shortly introduce the basic terminology used in this paper.
2.1 Neural networks
We assume the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of a neural
network (see, e.g., [33]). In Fig. 2 we depict a simple neural network,
which we will later use to explain our approach. We do not make any
assumptions about the architecture or parameters (e.g., the activation
functions) of the neural network. Let Y be the set of output classes.
Given an n-dimensional input ~x ∈ Rn and an index ` ∈ N of a d-
dimensional layer, we define the functions watch : Rn × N → Rd
and classify : Rn → Y . We letwatch(~x, `) be the output at layer `
and classify(~x) be the class predicted by the network. Our approach
is based on the following assumption, supported by other works [42].
Assumption 1 The layers close to the output layer of a neural net-
work contain high-level information. Moreover, the output at these
layers is similar for inputs of the same class and different for inputs
of different classes.
2.2 Box abstraction
Our monitor will observe the output at a d-dimensional layer (i.e., it
obtains vectors inRd). Given a finite setX ⊆ Rd of such vectors, we
want to construct a set Y ⊇ X that generalizes X to infinitely many
elements. This concept is known as abstraction. The rationale is to
choose a simple representation for Y that is easy to manipulate and
answer queries for. In this context, we are interested in the following
operations on such sets Y :
• creation of a set Y from a finite set X of vectors,
• a membership test for a vector ~x (i.e., deciding ~x ∈ Y ), and
• (optional) enlargement (or bloating) to a superset Y ′ ⊇ Y .
Here we focus on the box abstraction [9] where the set Y is a Carte-
sian product of intervals [li, ui] with li and ui being the respective
lower and upper bounds in dimension i. Geometrically, the shape of
Y is better known as a box (or hyperrectangle). A d-dimensional box
can be represented by 2d bounds. Creating a tight box around a set of
Algorithm 1: Constructing abstraction at layer `
Input: Y: output classes
D = {〈~x(1), y(1)〉, . . . , 〈~x(m), y(m)〉}: training data
Output: A1, . . . , A|Y|: lists of abstractions
1 for y ∈ Y do
// collect all outputs at layer ` for inputs of class y
2 Wy ←
{
watch(~x, `)
∣∣∣∣〈~x, y〉 ∈ D ∧ y = classify(~x)};
3 Cy ← cluster(Wy); // compute clusters for collected vectors
4 Ay ← [ ] ; // list of abstractions for class y
5 for C ∈ Cy do
// construct abstraction for vectors in cluster C
6 ACy ← abstract(U );
7 Ay .add(ACy ) ; // add abstraction to list
8 end
9 end
10 return A1, . . . , A|Y|
m vectors is a simple O(dm) task. Testing membership of a vector
in a box is in O(d). Boxes can be enlarged (absolutely or relatively)
by extending the bounds in O(d).
3 OUTSIDE-THE-BOX MONITORING
In this section we describe the process of building and employing a
monitor for a neural-network classifier.
3.1 Constructing a monitor
The first step is to construct a monitor for a given trained neural net-
work and a labeled training dataset. We would typically use the same
dataset that the network was trained on, but this is not obligatory. We
require access to the network’s output at predefined layers (which we
call the watched layers). To simplify the presentation, we describe
the concept for a single watched layer `, but the generalization to
multiple layers is straightforward and investigated in Section 5.
In Algorithm 1 we present the pseudocode for constructing a mon-
itor at layer `. The algorithm consists of three phases for each output
class. In the first phase (line 2), we run the network on the training
data while watching layer `, i.e., we collect the corresponding output
at layer `. The output is labeled with the corresponding ground-truth
class (we only consider correctly classified input data).
Example 1 Recall the network from Fig. 2 and the following labeled
training data for output classes • and :
D = { 〈(0.7, 0.2)T, •〉, 〈(0.6, 0.2)T, •〉, 〈(0.7, 0.1)T, •〉,
〈(0.8, 0.1)T, •〉, 〈(0.9, 0.2)T, •〉, 〈(0.5, 0.5)T, 〉,
〈(0.5, 0.6)T, 〉, 〈(0.4, 0.6)T, 〉, 〈(0.2, 0.7)T, 〉 }
Watching the second (hidden) layer `2, we obtain the following vec-
tors, which we label with the ground truth (also depicted in Fig. 2):
W• = {(0.02, 0.33)T, (0.04, 0.3)T, (0, 0.27)T, (0, 0.3)T, (0, 0.39)T}
W = {(0.3, 0.45)T, (0.38, 0.51)T, (0.4, 0.48)T, (0.52, 0.48)T}
Having obtained the (labeled) vectors from the training data, we
continue with the second phase. Since the vectors collected for each
Algorithm 2: Monitoring at layer `
Input: ~x: network input
A1, . . . , A|Y|: lists of abstractions
Output: “accept”/“reject”: answer
1 y ← classify(~x) ; // predict class of ~x
2 ~v ←watch(~x, `) ; // collect output at layer `
3 for ACy ∈ Ay do // check each abstraction for class y
4 if ~v ∈ ACy then
5 return “accept” ; // found an abstraction containing ~v
6 end
7 end
8 return “reject” ; // ~v is not contained in any abstraction
class often cover different ranges of the state space, we use a cluster-
ing algorithm to identify those vectors that belong to the same region
(line 3). We note that this step is not mandatory, but we found that
it can improve the precision substantially. In our implementation, we
use k-means clustering [22], which requires to fix the number of clus-
ters in advance; hence we iteratively increase the number of clusters
until the relative improvement of the sum-of-squares metric falls be-
low a threshold τ .
In the third phase, we construct a box abstraction for each com-
bination of class and cluster identified before (function abstract in
line 6). As a result, we obtain a list of abstractions for each class.
Example 2 Consider again Example 1. For simplicity, we assume
that we obtain a single cluster for each class. For each class-cluster
combination, we construct the tightest box that contains all vectors,
as depicted in Fig. 2 on the right. For instance, for class • the ex-
tremal values are [0, 0.04] in dimension 0 and [0.27, 0.39] in dimen-
sion 1, which correspond to the green box in the lower left.
3.2 Monitoring procedure
We have computed an abstraction by watching a given layer ` during
monitor training. We now describe how the monitor uses this abstrac-
tion to operate at runtime.
Recall the architecture from Fig. 1. We summarize the pseudocode
of the monitoring procedure in Algorithm 2. Given an input vector
~x, we first ask the network for a prediction y (function classify in
line 1). While the inputs are propagated through the network, we
observe the output vector ~v at layer ` (line 2). (Note that, in practice,
the second step can be implemented as part of the first step instead
of querying the neural network twice.) We then ask the abstractions
Ay constructed for class y whether one of them contains ~v (line 4).
If this is the case, we conclude that the network processed the input
in a usual way, and the monitor accepts the prediction y (line 5).
Otherwise, we conclude that the network has processed the input in
an unusual way, and the monitor rejects the input (line 8).
In Fig. 3, we give an example of the box abstraction in an arbi-
trary 2D projection for one of our benchmarks. Note that the boxes
are created from the training dataset and the figure shows the points
from the test dataset. With few exceptions, the boxes still contain the
points of the same class. As can be seen in the figure, most of the nov-
elties are not contained in any box for this projection, which leads to
rejection by the monitor regardless of the class the network predicts.
The novelties inside the boxes of class  would still be rejected if the
network predicts the class •.
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Figure 3: Box abstraction and the outputs obtained for new data at the
second-to-last layer on the MNIST benchmark (see Section 5) with
two known classes (•, ) and one unknown class (?) (projection to
two arbitrary dimensions). For better visibility, we fixed the number
of boxes to three per class.
4 DISCUSSION
We now discuss the detection effectiveness and resource efficiency
of our monitoring approach.
4.1 Detection effectiveness
We consider the potential outcomes of a query to a monitored net-
work. Firstly, since the abstractions overapproximate all vectors ever
seen during training, the monitor never rejects a training input.
Proposition 1 Given a monitored network and an input ~x seen dur-
ing monitor training, the monitor always accepts the prediction of
the network.
Additional training always raises the monitor’s acceptance rate
since new inputs can only increase the abstraction. We say that an
abstraction has converged if it has reached a fixpoint, i.e., if addi-
tional training on any new input of a known class does not enlarge
the abstraction anymore. Monitors with converged abstraction gen-
eralize the above property to any inputs of the known classes, and
conversely, warnings of monitors with converged abstraction are al-
ways genuine. Consequently, false warnings can only occur for non-
converged abstraction, and they indicate that more training data is
required. We summarize this observation below.
Proposition 2 Consider a monitored network with converged ab-
straction and an input ~x. If the network predicts the correct class,
the monitor accepts the prediction. If the monitor rejects the predic-
tion, then ~x does not belong to the predicted class.
By design, an abstraction loses the direct link to the inputs they
were created for. As a result, if a point is outside the abstraction, then
we can determine with certainty that this point does not belong to
the set outlined by the abstraction. On the other hand, when a point
lies inside the boundaries of the abstraction, we cannot conclude if
the set of values inside the abstraction and the given point belong to
the same input class. This property makes abstraction efficient, and
determining the values outside an abstraction is sufficient for novelty
detection. However, if a novelty produces layer outputs falling inside
an abstraction, we would still like to reject this input. In Section 6.3,
we describe a possible countermeasure to equip the abstraction with
an additional rejection mechanism in above-described cases. Alterna-
tively, one could use another novelty-detection approach in parallel.
Assume the abstraction has not yet converged. We differentiate
two cases of false warnings (false positives). In the first case, the
vector obtained from the watched layer is outside the abstraction but
close to its border. Then the abstraction is too precise, meaning that
its generalization power is too weak. Generally one can enlarge the
abstraction to prevent such scenarios. In the second case, the vector
is far outside the abstraction. According to Assumption 1 that the
output at the layer ` is representative of the input, it follows that
the network has processed the input in a unique way never observed
during training. Hence this case indicates insufficient training.
Now consider the case when the monitor accepts the input, i.e.,
the vector observed at layer ` is inside the abstraction, but the predic-
tion of the network is wrong (false negative). With Assumption 1, the
monitor should not have seen any neighboring vector during training.
In this case, the abstraction is too coarse. We proposed to use clus-
tering in order to mitigate such scenarios. As an alternative, we also
experimented with more precise types of abstractions, for which we
found the burden on the monitor efficiency too heavy (see Section 5).
4.2 Resource efficiency
As mentioned in Section 2, the box abstraction provides linear-time
operations for creation, membership, and (relative or absolute) en-
largement. Set creation is used during monitor training only. In par-
ticular, creating a box abstraction from samples is an incremental
process, which is advantageous for processing large datasets, as we
do not require to store all data at once. Note that our presentation of
Algorithm 1 processes the data in one batch for clustering, but any
online-clustering algorithm (e.g., [8]) can be used in an efficient im-
plementation. We remark that creation of a box abstraction can be
parallelized, but we use a sequential implementation.
The size of memory required to store a box is independent of the
amount of training data. Thus the monitor requires memory that is
linear in the number of neurons of the watched layers.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we assess the performance of our monitoring frame-
work, where we employ the following setup. To emulate the scenario
of novel inputs, we train a neural network on k out of n available
classes and vary k in the range [2, n). We choose the first k classes
in the order defined by each dataset. (Further experiments did not
reveal a significant correlation between the monitoring performance
and the particular ordering of the k classes.) We use the same net-
work training parameters (e.g., number of epochs) for all instances
of the same benchmark. After training the network, we construct the
monitor from the same training data. To simulate convergence of the
abstraction, we also include a scenario where we additionally train
the box abstraction on the k classes of the test dataset. We then run
the monitored network on the whole test dataset of n classes.
Since our approach is complementary to classification tech-
niques, we analyze four popular datasets for image classification:
MNIST [20], fashion MNIST (F MNIST) [38], CIFAR-10 [19], and
German traffic signs (GTSRB) [34]. We use two neural-network
models from [6], which we call NN1 and NN2. More information
on the datasets and training parameters are provided in Tab. 1.
A monitor solves a binary classification problem. Given an input
and a network prediction, the task is to either accept or reject this
Table 1: Benchmarks and their parameters used in training the models
from [6]. Column “Acc. train / test” shows the training and testing
accuracy, respectively. Accuracy fluctuates for the models trained on
different numbers of classes and we provide a range.
ID Dataset Classes Inputs train / test Network Epochs Acc. train / test %
1 MNIST 10 60,000 / 10,000 NN1 10 99/99
2 F MNIST 10 60,000 / 10,000 NN1 30 98− 99/91− 99
3 CIFAR-10 10 60,000 / 10,000 NN2 200 99/71− 95
4 GTSRB 43 39,209 / 12,630 NN2 10 98− 99/88− 97
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Figure 4: Softmax output for the F MNIST benchmark with three
known classes (blue (x0), black (x1), green (x2)) and one unknown
class (red). For each class there are 1,000 inputs.
prediction, which is also called a negative and a positive test, respec-
tively. Novelty detection corresponds to a true positive. Two types of
errors can occur: the input is rejected when it must be accepted (false
positive, equivalent to a false alarm), or the input is accepted when it
must be rejected (false negative, equivalent to a miss). In Tab. 2 we
outline our notation for these cases later used in the plots.
Table 2: Notation for possible monitoring outcomes in the plots. We
say that a network prediction is correct if it matches the ground truth.
Pattern Label Explanation
false positives
false negatives
true positives
false positive prediction correct & outside abstraction
false negative ¬ prediction correct & ¬ outside abstraction
false positives
false negatives
true positivestrue positive ¬ prediction correct & outside abstraction
In this experiment, we demonstrate the performance of our moni-
toring framework in comparison to two related novelty-detection ap-
proaches, which we shortly recall next.
The first approach is the softmax prediction probability approach
from [16], in the following called “threshold” approach. The idea is
to interpret the softmax output of the neural network as a probability.
Given a threshold value α, the approach rejects an input whenever
the probability assigned to the output class falls below this threshold.
We note that this approach can be restated as a special case in our
framework: observing only the output layer, we use a single box for
each class ci with range [α, 1] in dimension i (the dimension cor-
responding to class ci) and unbounded range (−∞,∞) in all other
dimensions; since α is fixed, there is no monitor training involved.
In Fig. 4, we depict the output distribution of the F MNIST bench-
mark for three known and one unknown class. For three classes the
outputs can in principle be distributed on a triangular plane. However,
as can be seen, the network prefers to assign outputs to the corners
or at least to the edges of the triangle (“+” markers in the figure),
which correspond to a prediction probability 0 for two or one of the
classes, respectively. For novel inputs (red dots in the figure) the net-
work tends to do the same. Hence the threshold approach requires a
high value α to reject them (we use 0.9 and 0.99 in the experiments).
We observed that the threshold approach performs poorly in sce-
narios with few known (or equivalently: many unknown) classes.
Since for n classes the prediction probability can range in the in-
terval [1/n , 1], we normalized the threshold values relative to those
intervals. For example, in an experiment with n = 2 known classes
we map the threshold 0.9 to [1/2 , 1] · 0.9 = 0.95. For small values
of n the normalized version would thus reject more inputs. Still, the
threshold approach does not perform well in these scenarios.
As the second approach for comparison, we consider what we call
the Boolean abstraction from [6]. We apply the abstraction in the
last hidden layer, as suggested by the authors. Given a Boolean ab-
straction f , membership of a vector ~x reduces to satisfiability of a
Boolean formula, which is expensive to decide. Indeed, we were only
able to employ the abstraction in the NN1 network’s last hidden layer
(40 neurons) and ran out of memory (8 GB) while constructing the
formula on the NN2 network’s last hidden layer (84 neurons). Com-
pared to an average training time of 8 seconds on the 60,000 training
inputs and 2 seconds for monitoring the 10,000 test inputs for our
monitor in the MNIST benchmark (with four watched layers), the
Boolean abstraction took 48 seconds for training and 17 seconds for
running, respectively (with a single watched layer).
In Fig. 5, we compare the performance of the outlined approaches.
As can be seen, learning from the test data (last bar) in addition to the
training data often barely affects the novelty detection (i.e., the solid
blue bars are of almost equal length) but eliminates false warnings
(outlined red bars) as expected. Overall, our approach is robust in
all scenarios. For the first three benchmarks we used a clustering
threshold of τ = 0.07. The GTSRB benchmark (for which we only
report results for the instances with up to 20 classes due to the lack
of space) uses much fewer (less than 1,000) training data per class,
which is not enough for our monitor to converge sufficiently. Hence
we used a coarser value τ = 0.3 and also increased the boxes by
10% after training. Notice that for 19 known classes the number of
misclassifications (the height of the solid blue and decorated yellow
bars combined) produced by the network is higher than the one for
the same network trained on 18 known classes, indicating that the
former has inferior precision (which we validated on the test dataset).
The runtime statistics, given in Table 3, shows that monitoring takes
less than a millisecond per input despite watching multiple layers.
Table 3: Runtime statistics for different benchmarks. We report the
accumulated time for clustering (“Cluster”) and for creating the ab-
straction (“Creation”) on all training inputs, and the time for running
the monitor (“Running”) on all test inputs, averaged over all runs
presented in Fig. 5. The results were obtained on a laptop (2.20 GHz
CPU with four cores and 8 GB RAM) using Linux.
MNIST F MNIST CIFAR-10 GTSRB
Cluster 158.8 s 198.1 s 168.1 s 6.1 s
Creation 7.6 s 14.3 s 15.2 s 1.32 s
Running 2.1 s 4.4 s 5.6 s 9.2 s
We also experimented with combinations of our monitor and the
threshold approach. For instance, we used our monitor for rejection
and, in case of acceptance, used the result of the threshold approach.
However, we were not able to identify a superior combination, possi-
bly because the threshold approach is a special case of our approach.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
20
40
60
80
100
Decision performance novelty_MNIST
(a) MNIST: last four layers; τ = 0.07; 283 watched neurons.
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(b) F MNIST: last five layers; τ = 0.07; 602 watched neurons.
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(c) CIFAR-10: last four layers; τ = 0.07; 826 watched neurons.
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(d) GTSRB: last hidden layer; τ = 0.3; 84 watched neurons.
Figure 5: Comparison of novelty detection. Bars from left to right: threshold approach with α = 0.9 and α = 0.99, Boolean abstraction
(MNIST and F MNIST only), and box abstraction (excluding and including training on test dataset; parameters given in the captions). The x
axis shows the number of known classes.
6 FRAMEWORK FLEXIBILITY
This section is dedicated to demonstrating features of the framework
that can be explored by the user to improve the desired metrics.
6.1 Monitoring multiple layers
For evaluating the combination of different layers, we monitored the
MNIST benchmark with box abstraction for the last three hidden
layers. We use the monitor policy to accept inputs only if the cor-
responding outputs at all layers are inside the respective abstraction.
The detection performance is given in Fig. 6. As expected, the num-
ber of warnings increases with the number of watched layers, and we
mainly see an increase in correct warnings (true positives). Interest-
ingly, monitoring the last layer is already sufficiently precise for this
benchmark on instances with many known classes (right part of the
figure), but on the instances with few known classes the combination
with other layers is more powerful and no layer alone can achieve the
combined performance (left part of the figure).
6.2 Enlarging boxes
Our monitor can be easily tuned to be more (or less) restrictive by
shrinking (or enlarging) the boxes. This roughly corresponds to de-
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Figure 6: Box abstraction with different observed layers. We con-
sider all combinations of the last three layers (`x, `y , and `z) for the
MNIST benchmark. The order of the bars from left to right is `z; `y;
`x; `y, `z; `x, `z; `x, `y; `x, `y, `z .
or increasing the factor α in the threshold approach. We can simulta-
neously reason about arbitrary box sizes by computing the Euclidean
distance from data points not inside any boxes to the box centers. We
illustrate the idea in Fig. 7 on the left. The line segment connecting
the green point with the box center has distance γd, where d is the
dγd
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Figure 7: Left: enlarging a box by factor γ. Right: results for enlarged
boxes by different factors γ (x axis) for the MNIST benchmark with
five known and unknown classes each.
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Figure 8: Box abstraction on the F MNIST benchmark as in Fig. 5
(left) and with rejection based on risk (right).
distance of the center and the intersection of the line segment with
the border of the box. Hence we would need to increase the box (i.e.,
each interval) by at least factor γ in order to contain the point (if we
use a uniform increase factor).
Computing the factor γ for each point, we can then plot the results
for varying values of γ, e.g., using a uniform range as in Fig. 7 on
the right. From this plot, based on the preferences, we can choose
a policy to achieve, e.g., a fixed false-positive rate. For instance, to
avoid false positives altogether, we should increase the boxes by fac-
tor γ = 0.09 for maximal detection (the red slices for larger values in
the figure are just plotting artifacts). Given such a policy, the optimal
value γ can be found automatically.
6.3 Rejecting novelties inside a box
In the experiments, we already observed a good performance of
boxes in terms of novelty detection. We can further decrease the
number of undetected novelties by learning the local effectiveness of
each box. To achieve this, we can use novel data points in training the
monitor. For each box, depending on the number of novelties falsely
accepted during monitor training, we can estimate their probability
of accepting more novelties at runtime.
Treating every instance of a neuron value falling into a box (black
stars in Fig. 3) as a Bernoulli experiment, we can estimate the prob-
ability of a new point being novel, conditional on it being inside a
given box, as the ratio of the number of true novelties in this box to
the total number of points in the box. We call this metric the outside-
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
20
40
60
80
100
Decision performance other_abstractions_MNIST
Figure 9: Evaluation of further abstractions on the MNIST bench-
mark. Bars from left to right: balls, octagons, and boxes from Fig. 5.
the-box risk, or ρ. Computed for each box locally, this metric indi-
cates the level of risk that a value never seen during training falls
into a particular box. We can additionally evaluate this risk during
monitor training. At runtime, we accept a point in a box with the
probability 1 − ρ. In Fig. 8, we show the effect on F MNIST. The
novelty detection can be improved but only given a higher tolerance
to false positives.
6.4 Comparing abstractions
Following the same main ideas as for boxes, our framework allows
to consider other types of abstractions. We report results for two
of them: (Euclidean) balls and shapes called “octagons” [24]. Oc-
tagons are tighter versions of boxes with additional diagonal edges.
They can be stored as difference-bound matrices withO(d2) entries,
where d is the number of neurons of the watched layer. Determining
whether a point lies inside a ball is linear in d (as it is for boxes), but
for octagons it is quadratic. Since a ball needs to have the same radius
in each dimension and neural networks do not use the same domain
for each neuron, balls are normally too coarse to be effective. As oc-
tagon abstraction is more precise than box abstraction, octagons may
detect more novelties but also raise more false warnings. We com-
pare these abstractions on the MNIST benchmark in Fig. 9, where
we used the second-to-last layer for balls and octagons. As can be
seen, octagons are strictly outperformed by boxes (in four layers) in
both higher detection power and fewer false warnings, while being
computationally much heavier (121 seconds compared to 2 seconds
for boxes).
7 CONCLUSIONS
Guaranteeing correctness of systems that rely on neural-network
classifiers remains an important open challenge. In safety-critical ap-
plications, addressing the problem of novelty detection is crucial.
The framework we propose in this paper brings us one step closer
to a general methodology for developing reliable machine-learned
tools. Inspired by abstraction techniques that have proved effective
in the program-analysis domain, we monitor neural networks at run-
time. Experimental results on common benchmarks for image clas-
sification demonstrate that our framework for constructing box ab-
stractions of neural-network layers is effective in detecting novelties
and computationally cheap. As future direction, we plan to apply our
approach in a real-world setting such as monitoring neural-network
controllers for cyber-physical systems.
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